Abstract-In ownership-based access control frameworks with the possibility of delegating permissions and administrative rights, delegation chains will form. There are different ways to treat delegation chains when revoking rights, which give rise to different revocation schemes. In this paper, we investigate the problem of delegation revocation from the perspective of the knowledge base paradigm. A knowledge base is a formal specification of domain knowledge in a rich formal language. Multiple forms of inference can be applied to this formal specification in order to solve various problems and tasks that arise in the domain. In other words, the paradigm proposes a strict separation of concerns between information and problem solving. The knowledge base that we use in this paper specifies the effects of the various revocation schemes. By applying different inferences to this knowledge base, we can solve the following tasks: to determine the state of the system after a certain delegation or revocation; to interactively simulate the progression of the system state through time; to determine whether a user has a certain permission or administrative right given a certain state of the system; to verify invariants of the system; and to determine which revocation schemes give rise to a certain specified set of desired outcomes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In ownership-based frameworks for access control, it is common to allow principals (users or processes) to grant both permissions and administrative rights to other principals in the system. Often it is desirable to grant a principal the right to further grant permissions and administrative rights to other principals. This may lead to delegation chains starting at a source of authority (the owner of a resource) and passing on certain permissions to other principals in the chain [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] .
Furthermore, such frameworks commonly allow a principal to revoke a permission that she granted to another principal [5] , [6] , [3] , [7] . Depending on the reasons for the revocation, different ways to treat the chain of principals whose permissions depended on the second principal's delegation rights can be desirable [5] , [8] . For example, if one is revoking a permission given to an employee because he is moving to another position in the company, it makes sense to keep the permissions of principals who received them from this employee; but if one is revoking a permission from a user who has abused his rights and is hence distrusted by the user who granted the permission, it makes sense to delete the permissions of principals who received them from this user. Any algorithm that determines which permissions to keep intact and which permissions to delete when revoking a permission is called a revocation scheme.
Hagström et al. [5] have presented a framework for classifying possible revocation schemes along three different dimensions: the extent of the revocation to other grantees (propagation), the effect on other grants to the same grantee (dominance), and the permanence of the negation of rights (resilience). Since there are two options along each dimension, there are in total eight different revocation schemes in Hagström et al.'s framework. This classification was based on revocation schemes that had been implemented in database management systems [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] .
In this paper, we investigate the problem of delegation revocation from the perspective of the knowledge base paradigm, a declarative programming paradigm based on the idea of strictly separating information and problem solving. A knowledge base is a formal specification of domain knowledge in a rich formal language. Multiple forms of inference can be applied to this formal specification in order to solve various problems and tasks that arise in the domain. The IDP system is an implementation of the knowledge base paradigm with associated formal language FO(·), an extension of first-order logic [13] .
In this paper we present an application of the knowledge base paradigm to delegation revocation, realized in the IDP system. We have written a formal specification of the eight revocation schemes in Hagström et al.'s framework, which formally described their effects. By applying different inferences to this specification, we can solve various tasks that can be useful both for implementing a system which allows for these revocation schemes and for supporting a user of such a system: Given a certain state of the system and a certain action (delegation or revocation), one inference determines the state of the system after this action. Another inference can interactively simulate the progression of the system state through time. A third determines whether a user has a certain permission or administrative right given a certain state of the system. A fourth inference allows to verify that the system satisfies certain invariants. Finally, there is an inference that allows a user to specify a set of desired outcomes (e.g. that a certain user should no longer have a certain right while another user is unaffected) and determine which actions give rise to this outcome.
This work constitutes a proof of concept, and we hope that it will inspire other researchers in computer security to consider the possibility of applying the methodology of the knowledge base paradigm to their research.
The paper is structured as follows: We introduce Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework in Section II. In Section III we motivate and describe the knowledge base paradigm, the IDP system and its specification language FO(·). Section IV presents the application of the knowledge base paradigm to Hagström et al.'s framework. Section V discusses related work and section VI concludes.
II. THE DELEGATION REVOCATION FRAMEWORK
In this section we present Hagström et al.'s [5] delegation revocation framework.
Let P be the set of principals (users or processes) in the system, let O be the set of objects for which authorizations can be stated, and let A be the set of access types, i.e. of actions that principals may perform on objects. For every object o ∈ O, there is a source of authority (SOA), for example the owner of file o, which is a principal that has full power over object o and is the ultimate authority with respect to accesses to object o. For any a ∈ A and o ∈ O, the SOA of o can grant the right to access a on object o to other principals in the system, and can also delegate the right to grant access and to grant this delegation right. Additionally, the framework allows for negative authorizations, which can be used to block a principal's access or delegation rights without deleting any authorization.
We assume that all authorizations in the system are stored in an authorization specification, and that every authorization is of the form (i, j, a, o, sign , b 1 , b 2 ), where i, j ∈ P , a ∈ A, o ∈ O, sign is + or −, and b 1 and b 2 are booleans (T or F ). The meaning of this authorization is that principal i is granting some permission concerning access type a on object o to principal j. If sign is +, then the permission is a positive permission, else it is a negative permission. If b 1 is T , the permission contains the right to delegate the permission further, i.e. to issue positive permissions. If b 2 is T , the permission contains the right to issue negative permissions. Since it does not make sense to combine a negative permission with the right to delegate a positive or negative permission, b 2 by defining a binary relation R between permissions. R is defined to hold precisely for those pairs of permissions shown in Table 1 . 1 Informally πRρ means that a principal 1 Note that in [5] , the definition of R also includes the pair (+, F, T )R(+, F, F ) of permissions. The inclusion of this pair however contradicts the informal explanations that Hagstöm et al. have given, so that we assume that it was included by mistake. with permission π can grant permission ρ to other principals.
We say that a permission π is stronger than a permission ρ iff the set of permissions that a principal with permission π can grant is a strict superset of the set of permissions that a principal with permission ρ can grant. So (+, T, T ) is stronger than any other permission, and all permissions other than (+, F, F ) and (−, F, F ) are stronger than both (+, F, F ) and (−, F, F ).
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Note that there is no interaction between the rights of principals concerning different access-object pairs (a, o), so we can consider a and o to be fixed for the rest of the paper. For these two reasons, we simplify an authorization
A. Delegation chains and connectivity property
In this subsection we focus on the part of the system that does not involve negative authorizations. In Subsection II-B we will introduce negative authorizations.
Hagström et al. use the notion of a principal p having a permission π without formally defining it. The intended meaning of this can be formalized using the notion of a rooted delegation chain: 3 
Definition 1:
A rooted delegation chain for principal i with respect to permission π is a sequence p 1 , . . . , p n of principals satisfying the following properties: 1) p 1 is the source of authority.
We say that a principal p has permission π iff there is a rooted delegation chain for principal p with respect to permission π.
Hagström et al.'s framework allows an authorization of the form (i, j, sign , b 1 , b 2 ) to be in the authorization specification only if i has a permission that allows i to grant this authorization. This is called the connectivity property:
This property can be viewed as an invariant that any system based on Hagström et al.'s framework needs to satisfy.
We visualize an authorization specification by a labelled directed graph as in the following example: In this example, in which A is the SOA (as in all forthcoming examples), the principals A, B and D have permission (+, T, T ), C has permission (+, T, F ), and E has no rights concerning the access type and object in question.
B. Negative authorizations and inactivation of authorizations
A negative authorization from i to j can inactivate a positive authorization from i to j without deleting it. Hagström et al. [5] give two motivations for the use of negative authorizations: They can make a revocation resilient, i.e. make its effect time-persistent, and it can be used for temporarily taking away rights from a user without deleting anything from the authorization specification, so that it is easier to go back to the state that was in place before this temporary removal of rights.
Hagström et al. leave it open whether negative permissions dominate positive ones or the other way round. If the system has a positive-takes-precedence conflict resolution policy, then positive permission take precedence; in this case, the resilient effect of a negative authorization is not given, so the only motivation to use negative authorizations in such a system it for a temporary removal of rights. If the system has a negative-takes-precedence conflict resolution policy, then negative permission take precedence; in this case, the distinction (explained below) between weak negative revocations and strong negative revocations disappears. In this paper, we assume the system to have a system has a positive-takesprecedence conflict resolution policy.
We assume the set of authorizations in the authorization specification to be divided into a set of active authorizations and a set of inactive authorizations. The revocation schemes that revoke a right by issuing a negative authorization inactivate some authorizations, i.e. turn some active authorizations into inactive authorizations. Negative authorizations are always active.
We define a rooted delegation chain to be active iff every authorization in it is active. We say that a principal p actively has permission π iff there is an active rooted delegation chain for principal p with respect to permission π.
Additionally to the connectivity property mentioned, we can also define an active connectivity property as follows:
Active-connectivity property: For every active authorization (i, j, sign , b 1 , b 2 ) in the authorization specification, i actively has a permission ρ with
Unlike the connectivity property, the active-connectivity property is not mentioned by Hagström et al., but is actually also an invariant of the system they define.
C. The three dimensions
Hagström et al. [5] have introduced three dimensions according to which revocation schemes can be classified. These are called propagation, dominance and resilience:
Propagation. The decision of a principal i to revoke an authorization previously granted to a principal j may either be intended to affect only the direct recipient j or to affect all the other users in turn authorized by j. In the first case, we say that the revocation is local, in the second case that it is global.
Dominance. This dimension deals with the case when a principal losing a permission in a revocation still has permissions from other grantors. If these other grantors' are dependent on the revoker, she can dominate these grantors and revoke the permissions from them. This is called a strong revocation. The revoker can also choose to make a weak revocation, where permissions from other grantors to a principal losing a permission are kept.
In order to formalize this dimension, we need to define what we mean by a principal's delegation rights to be independent of another principal:
Definition 3: A principal j has delegation rights independent of a principal i with respect to permission π iff there is an rooted delegation chain for j with respect to π that does not contain the principal i.
Resilience. This dimension distinguishes revocation by removal of positive authorizations from revocation by negative authorizations which just inactivate positive authorizations. Given that we concentrate on the fragment of Hagström et al.'s framework without negative revocations, we will not explain this dimension in detail.
D. The revocation schemes
Since there are two options along each of the three dimensions, Hagström et al. defined eight different revocation schemes. Below we give semi-formal explanations of these eight revocation schemes. Fully formalized definitions are provided by the specification in Appendix A, which we describe in Subsection IV-A. We illustrate each revocation scheme with an example in which the authorization from A to B in the following authorisation specification is revoked according to the revocation scheme under consideration: 1) The authorization from i to j is deleted.
2) If step 1 causes j to lose a permission, all authorizations emerging from j that j is no longer entitled to grant are deleted. 3) If j still has another permission, each authorization deleted in step 2 is replaced by the strongest possible authorization that j is entitled to grant and that is weaker than the deleted authorization.
Step 2 ensures that the connectivity property is satisfied at j. This being a local revocation scheme, step 4 ensures that all rights that users other than j had before the operation are intact. In this example, the authorizations from B to C and from B to E were deleted and not replaced by any authorization, because the permission (+, F, F ) that B still has does no entitle B to grant any authorization.
2) Weak Global Delete: A Weak Global Delete (WGD) of a positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
1) The authorization from i to j is deleted.
2) Recursively, any authorization emerging from a principal k who loses a permission in step 1 or step 2 is deleted and replaced by the strongest possible authorization that k is entitled to grant and that is weaker than the deleted authorization. The recursive step 2 ensures that the connectivity property is satisfied for the whole authorization specification after this operation.
3) Strong Local Delete: A Strong Local Delete (SLD) of a positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
2) Every authorization of the form
3) If steps 1 and 2 cause j to lose a permission, all authorizations emerging from j that j is no longer entitled to grant are deleted. 4) If j still has another permission, each authorization deleted in step 3 is replaced by the strongest possible authorization that j is entitled to grant and that is weaker than the deleted authorization.
The only difference to the Weak Local Delete is step 2, which is the step that makes this a strong revocation scheme. 
5) Negative revocations:
The negative revocations are similar to the positive revocations, only that instead of deleting positive authorizations, we inactivate them by issuing negative authorizations. We show this on the example of the Weak Local Negative. The other three negative revocation schemes are adapted versions of the corresponding delete revocations in a similar way.
A Weak Local Negative (WLN) of a positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
1) The negative authorization (i, j, −, F, F ) is added to the authorization specification. 2) Any positive authorization from i to j is inactivated. 3) If step 2 causes a permission of j to ne inactivated, all authorizations emerging from j that j is no longer entitled to grant are inactivated. 4) If j still actively has another permission, each authorization deleted in step 3 is replaced by the strongest possible authorization that j is entitled to grant and that is weaker than the inactivated authorization.
Unlike in the Weak Local Delete, we do not delete any authorizations, but just inactivate them. We graphically represent inactivated authoriazations by dashed lines. 
III. THE KNOWLEDGE BASE PARADIGM AND THE FO(·) KB PROJECT
Declarative systems have proven their merit in many application domains: From planning to scheduling to security contexts, many challenges have been tackled using declarative approach. For example, Barker et al. [15] used a rule-based approach to determine access rights in an access control system. Advantages of such an approach are readability and maintainability of a specification. However, only one task is supported in a rule based system, or in any other decalarative system. Every system has its own syntactical style, terminology, conceptualization, and designated style of inference (rule based systems do chaining, databases do querying, answer set programming generates answer sets, etc.). Yet, in all of them, propositions need to be expressed. Take, e.g., "each lecture takes place at some time slot". This proposition could be an expression to be deduced from a formal specification if the task was a verification problem, or to be queried in a database, or it could be a constraint for a scheduling problem. It is, in the first place, just a piece of information and we see no reason why depending on the task to be solved, it should be expressed in a different formalism.
The knowledge base (KB) paradigm [16] was proposed as an answer to this. The KB paradigm applies a strict separation of concerns to information and problem solving. A KB system allows information to be stored in a knowledge base, and provides a range of inference methods. With these inference methods various types of problems and tasks can be solved using the same knowledge base. As such the knowledge base is neither a program nor a description of a problem, it cannot be executed or run. It is nothing but information. However, this information can be used to solve multiple sorts of problems. Many declarative problem solving paradigms are mono-inferential: they are based on one form of inference. In comparison, the KB paradigm is multi-inferential.
The FO(·) KB project is a research project in which an implementation of the KB paradigm is being developed. Its aim is to integrate different useful language constructs and forms of inference from different declarative paradigms in one rich declarative language and a KB system. So far, it has led to the KB language FO(·) [17] and the KB system IDP [13] , which are used in this paper.
A. The specification language FO(·)
FO(·) refers to a class of extensions of first-order logic (FO). The language of the current version of the IDP system (IDP 3) is FO(T, ID, Agg, arit, PF): FO extended with types, inductive definitions, aggregates, arithmetic and partial functions (see [17] , [18] ). In this work, we will only work (and as such, introduce) a subset of this language: F O(T, ID): typed first-order logic with inductive definitions. Abusing notation, we will use FO(·) as an abbreviation of this language.
B. An FO(·) specification
A specification of domain knowledge in FO(·) can consist of 3 types of building blocks: a vocabulary Σ, a theory T and a (partial) structure S. a) Vocabulary Σ.: A vocabulary is a declaration of the symbols used in the associated theories and structures. It is a set Σ of type symbols (denoted as Σ T ) and predicate symbols (denoted as Σ P ). Every predicate P of arity n has a fixed type [τ 1 , . . . , τ n ], where τ 1 , . . . , τ n are type symbols. Variables, atoms and first-order formulas are defined as usual.
b) Theory T .: A theory is a set of first-order formulas and inductive definitions. An inductive definition ∆ in FO(·) is a set of rules δ of the form P (t) ← ϕ, with ϕ a first-order formula. We call P (t) the head (head(δ)) and ϕ the body (body(δ)) of the rule. The symbols that occur in the head of a rule δ in ∆ are called the defined symbols in ∆. All other symbols that occur in ∆ are called the parameters of ∆. The semantics used for inductive definitions is the well-founded semantics; as argued in [17] , this captures the intended meaning of all forms of inductive definitions commonly used in mathematics and computer science. A structure S satisfies ∆ if the interpretation of a defined predicate P in the well-founded model of S, constructed relative to the restriction of S to the parameters of ∆, is exactly the relation P S . The following example illustrates the use of an inductive definition in a theory by presenting the defintion of "reachable" in FO(·).
Example 1: Assume a vocabulary containing a type N ode, and two predicates: Edge(N ode, N ode) and Reachable(N ode, N ode). Informally, Edge states that there is an edge between two nodes, while Reachable states that there is a path of edges between two nodes. We define what reachability means in terms of the edges, using an inductive definition ∆ in FO(·):
Given a vocabulary Σ, a partial structure gives an interpretation to (a subset of) the elements of Σ. Before we define formally what an interpretation is, we define the concept of a partial set, which is a generalisation of a set in a 3-valued context: A partial set on domain D is a function from D to {t, u, f }. A partial set is two-valued (or total) if u does not belong to its range. A (partial) structure S consists of a domain D τ for all types τ in Σ T and an assignment of a partial set P S to each predicate or function symbol P ∈ Σ P , called the interpretation of P in S. The interpretation P S of a predicate symbol P with type
In case the interpretation of a predicate P in S is a twovalued set, we abuse notation and use P S as shorthand for {d|P S (d) = t}. We call a partial structure total if the interpretation P S of every predicate symbol P ∈ Σ P is a total set. Note that with the abuse of notation just explained, a total structure as we have defined it can be identified with a first-order structure as it is usually defined.
Given two partial structures S = (D, I) and S ′ = (D, I ′ ), we write S ≤ p S ′ (and say S is more precise than S ′ , or S ′ expands S) iff for every predicate symbol P ∈ Σ P with type [τ 1 , . . . , τ n ] and every tupled ∈ D τ1 × . . . × D τn such that
C. The reasoning engine
In the FO(·) KB project, a implementation of a KB System was developed: the IDP system [13] . IDP takes an FO(·) specification (that is, a combination of vocabularies, theories and/or structures) and can do a number of reasoning tasks, by applying a suitable form of inference on this specification. Below, we present the inferences that we need in this paper:
• Modelexpand(T, S): Input: theory T and partial structure S. Output: either a total structure I such that I is a model of T and S ≤ p I, or UNSAT if there is no such I. Modelexpand [19] is a generalization for FO(·) theories of the modelexpansion task as defined in Mitchell et al. [20] .
• Allmodels(T, S): Input: theory T and partial structure S. Output: the set of all total structures I such that I is a model of T and S ≤ p I.
• Query(S, E): Input: a (partial) structure S and a set expression E = {x | ϕ(x)}. Output: the set A Q = {x | ϕ(x) S = t}.
• Progression(T, S i ): In [21] , LTC theories (Linear Time Calculus) are proposed, a syntactic subclass of FO(·) theories that allow to naturally model dynamic systems. An LTC theory consists of three types of constraints: constraints about the initial situation, invariants, and "bistate" formulas that relate the state on the current point in time with that of the next. Note that the specification presented in Subsection IV-A below is an LTC theory. The Progression inference: Input: an LTC theory T and a structure S i that provides information about the state of the system on a time point t. Output: a structure S t+1 that represents the next state (or a next possible state) at time point t + 1. Repeating this process, we can compute all subsequent states, effectively simulating the dynamic system defined by T .
IV. DELEGATION REVOCATION IN THE KB PARADIGM
In this section, we explain how the KB paradigm can be applied to delegation revocation. For this purpose, we show how the delegation revocation framework defined in Section II can be specified in FO(·), and how inferences on this specification can solve various tasks that arise in the domain. Some of these tasks are tasks that any system implementing the delegation revocation framework needs to solve, while others are tasks that support a user of such a system.
We have built a prototype in IDP in which this application of the KB paradigm is realized. This prototype also covers the negative authorizations and negative revocation schemes that this paper does not explain due to space restrictions. This prototype can be downloaded at http://icr.uni.lu/mcramer/downloads/hagstrom-RDS.zip and run in IDP 3.
A. The FO(·) specification of the delegation revocation framework
In this subsection, we describe how Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework, which we defined semiformally in Section II, can be formally specified in FO(·). The full specification can be found in Appendix A. Both in this subsection and in the appendix, we use IDP syntax for FO(·): The symbols &, |,˜, ! and ? mean ∧, ∨, ¬, ∀ and ∃ respectively, and the symbol sequence <-means ← (in inductive definitions).
The FO(·) specification models the change of the authorization specification over time. Principals are modelled as objects of the theory's domain, whereas positive authorizations are modelled by the predicate pos_auth. The authorizations cannot be modelled as objects, because they change over time, while FO(·) assumes a constant domain of objects.
We allow for four types of objects: Time, principal, scheme and permission. Time points are integers. There is a constant SOA of type principal that denotes the source of authority. The type scheme consists of the four delete revocation schemes (WLD, WGD, SLD and SGD), the four negative revocation schemes (WLN, WGN, SLN, SGN) and four schemes for granting the four different kinds of permissions (grantTT, grantTF, grantFT and grantFF). The permissions are TT, TF, FT and FF. The sign is not part of the permission, because the information provided by the sign is included in the choice between pos_auth and neg_auth.
As IDP only works with finite domains, the type Time actually just consists of a finite set of consecutive integers. There is a constant Start for the first time point, i.e. the smallest integer in the domain of time points in a given structure. The unary partial function Next maps a time point t to the next time point t+1, as long as t is not the last time point included in the domain.
The predicate pos_auth for positive authorizations takes four arguments: pos_auth(t,i,j,a) means that at time t, a positive authorization from principal i to principal j for permission a is in place. The predicate neg_auth, on the other hand, only takes three arguments, as no permssion needs to be specified for a negative authorization: neg_auth(t,i,j) means that at time t, a negative authorization from principal i to principal j is in place. There are two predicates, the tertiary pos_auth_start and the binary neg_auth_start, for specifying the positive and negative authorizations that are in place at the first time point Start.
Changes in the authorization specification are always triggered by some action by a principal: action(t,s,i,j) means that at time t, principal i performs an action of the (revocation or grant) scheme s affecting principal j. In the case of delete revocations and grants, these actions can lead to authorizations being deleted and/or new authorizations being included in the authorization specification. delete(t,i,j,a) means that between time points t-1 and t, the positive authorization from i to j for permission a gets deleted. new(t,i,j,a) means that between time points t-1 and t, a new positive authorization from i to j for permission a gets added to the authorization specification.
pos_auth is defined inductively by setting its values at the first time point Start to the start configuration specified by pos_auth_start, and by modifying its values between time t and t+1 according to the changes specified by delete and new: { p o s a u t h ( S t a r t , p1 , p2 , a ) <− p o s a u t h s t a r t ( p 1 , p2 , a ) . p o s a u t h ( N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) <− p o s a u t h ( t , p1 , p2 , a ) & ∼d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) . p o s a u t h ( N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) <− n e w ( N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) . } Additionally, there are predicates FF_delete and new_FF that specify changes on the negative authorizations, and FF is defined in a way analogous to pos_auth using these change predicated instead of delete and new.
The predicate chain(t,i,a) expresses that at time t, there exists a rooted delegation chain for principal i with respect to permission a. In Section II, rooted delegation chains are defined by quantifying over sequences of principals. This is in effect a second-order quantification, which is not possible in the first-order language FO(·). However, chain(t,i,a) can be equivalently defined through an inductive definition as follows: 4 { c h a i n ( t , SOA, TT ) .
c h a i n ( t , p1 , a1 ) <− ? p2 : c h a i n ( t , p2 , a ) & p o s a u t h ( t , p2 , p1 , a1 ) & R(a , a1 ) . c h a i n ( t , p , a ) <− c h a i n ( t , p , a1 ) & S t r o n g e r ( a 1 , a ) . }
The predicate can_grant(t,i,a) expresses that principal i has a permission that entitles him to grant the permission a. The predicate ind(t,i,j,a) models the independence of principal i from principal j with respect to a permission a, and the access right of principal i. These two predicates are defined as follows:
{ c a n g r a n t ( t , i , a ) <− ? a1 : c h a i n ( t , i , a1 ) & R(a1 , a ) .
Analogously to chain and can_grant, there are predicates active_chain and can_actively_grant that additionally take care of the authorizations in the chain being active.
The different effects of the different deletion revocation schemes are captured by the definitions of the predicates delete, inactive and new. delete is defined via an inductive definition with four clauses:
. d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <− p o s a u t h ( t , i , j , a ) & ∼ c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , i , a ) . d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , k , j , a ) <− p o s a u t h ( t , k , j , a ) & a c t i o n ( t , SLD , i , j ) & ? a1 : ( i n d ( t , k , i , a1 )& R(a1 , a ) ) . d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , z , w, a ) <− The first clause just states that in any deletion revocation scheme from i to j, the positive authorization from i to j is deleted. The second clause defines the propagation of deletion by specifying that any positive authorization from i to j gets deleted if i is losing its delegation right. The last two clauses capture the meaning of strong vs. weak dominance by specifying the additional deletions that are needed in strong revocation schemes.
The predicate inactive specifies which authorizations are inactive. The conditions for inactivating authorizations are analogous to the conditions for deleting authorization, only that they come into play in negative revocations rather than in delete revocations:
p o s p e r m ( t , j , k , a ) & ∼ c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , j , a ) . i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , z , j , a ) <− The last clause of inactive specifies that an inactivated authorization stays inactive. If an action of undoing a negative revocation was included in the framework, this clause would have to be modified so as to allow for reactivation. But since Hagström et al. do not define such an undoing of negative revocations, we do not include it in our formal specification of their framework either. The meaning of local vs. global propagation is captured by the inductive definition of the predicate new. It consists of four clauses which take care of four different reasons for adding new authorizations. For simplicity, we only present two of these clauses here: n e w ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <− ? d s : ( d s = g r a n t T T | d s = g r a n t T F | d s = g r a n t F T | d s = g r a n t F F ) & a c t i o n ( t , ds , i , j ) & R e l a t i o n ( a , d s )& c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a ) & ∼ ? a1 : ( c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a1 ) & R e l a t i o n ( a 1 , d s ) & S t r o n g e r ( a 1 , a ) ) .
n e w ( N e x t ( t ) , i , k , a ) <− ? j s : ( s =WLD | s =SLD ) & a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j ) & ( ? z : p o s a u t h ( t , z , k , a ) & c a n g r a n t ( t , z , a ) ) & ∼( ? z : p o s a u t h ( t , z , k , a ) & c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , z , a ) ) .
The first clause ensures that new positive authorizations are added when a granting action is performed by a principal. 5 The second clause takes care of adding the authorizations that are added in the last item of each of the definitions of Weak Local Delete and Strong Local Delete in Section II. Informally, this clause says that if in a local revocation scheme revoking a positive authorization from principal i to principal j, j is losing its delegation right, then every positive authorization from j to another principal k must be replaced by a positive authorization of the same authorization type from i to k. This new authorization from i to k ensure that the propagation defined in the second clause of the definition of delete does not continue beyond j.
The predicate access_right(t,i) means that principal i has access right at time t:
{ a c c e s s r i g h t ( t , p ) <− a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , p , a ) . a c c e s s r i g h t ( t , p ) <− ? p1 : c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , p1 , a )& p o s a u t h ( t , p1 , p , a ) & ∼i n a c t i v e ( t , p1 , p , a ) . }
B. Using inferences to solve various tasks
In this subsection we explain how different logical inferences, when applied to the FO(·) specification explained above, can solve various tasks that can be useful both for implementing a system which allows for delegation revocation and for supporting a user of such a system. Let us first consider tasks that a system that implements Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework needs to solve. Given a certain state of the system, defined by which authorizations are currently included in the authorization specification, and a given action (a delegation or revocation performed by some principal), the new state of the system after this action needs to be determined. This task can be performed using the Modelexpand inference as follows: Let T be the FO(·) specification of the delegation revocation framework. Let S be a partial structure with the following properties:
• The time domain of S contains only the two time points 0 and 1.
• S assigns to the predicate pos_auth_start the set of all authorizations currently included in the authorization specification.
• S assigns to the predicate action the given action at time 0.
• The value of all other predicates is undefined in S.
In this case, Modelexpand(T ,S) is a total structure that expands S and that is a model of T . Being a total structure, it assigns to pos_auth a set A of quintuples of the form (t, i, j, sign , a), where t is a time point (0 or 1), i and j are principals, sign is a sign, and a is a permission. Then the set A ′ := {(i, j, sign , a) | (1, i, j, sign , a) ∈ A} is the set of authorizations that constitutes the authorization specification after the action. (Note that since all predicates other than pos_auth_start and action are defined in T through an inductive definition, there is a unique model of T that expands S, so that the result of this inference is deterministic.)
This way we can determine the effect of a single action. It could be iterated by setting the value of pos_auth_start to be A ′ for the next iteration of this procedure. But the IDP system also supports an inference, namely the Progression inference, that is designed for this kind of temporal progression of a structure based on a theory with a type for time. The input structure of this inference provides information about the state of the system on a time point t; in our case that is the authorization specification at a given time. The output is a structure that represents the state of the authorization specification at time point t + 1. So the step of extracting A ′ from A that was required for iterating the above inference is no longer needed. So this inference can more straightforwardly be iterated, giving rise to an interactive simulation of the progression of the system state through time.
Of course, a system implementing Hagström et al.'s framework does not only need to determine how the authorization specification changes over time, but also needs to determine whether a principal requesting access or performing a certain administrative action actually has access right or the right to perform the action in question. This can be done with the Query inference: For example, if S is the partial structure that assigns to the predicate pos_auth_start the set of all authorizations currently included in the authorization specification, Query(S,{i | access_right(Start,i)}) returns the set of principals that have access right according to the current authorization specification.
When designing a system, one can avoid an erroneous design by specifying invariants that the system must satisfy at any moment during the execution of the system, and verify that these invariants are actually satisfied by the system. In the case of a system based on Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation system, examples of invariants that the system must satisfy are the connectivity property and the active-connectivity property defined in subsections II-A and II-B. We must, of course assume, that the system starts in a state that satisfies these two properties. All that remains to be shown, then, is that if the connectivity property holds at some time point t, it must also hold at the next time point t + 1, and similarly for the active-connectivity property.
One way that this can be done is by calling an automated theorem prover to prove this implication. However, this is not always viable, as the theory may be too complex for an automated theorem prover to be able to find a proof of the invariant. This is the case for our specification.
Another possibility is to prove that the invariant holds in fixed structures. In our case, we can fix a partial structure S with time points 0 and 1 and without any information about the predicates. In this case, the only information that we are fixing is the number of principals. We can then prove that the invariant holds for a fixed number of principals by establishing, using Modelexpand(T ′ ,S), that there is no total structure expanding S that is a model of the theory T ′ consisting of our specification T together with the statement that the connectivity property holds at time point 0 but not at time point 1. With this method, we have verified the connectivity property for any system with n principals for n ≤ 8.
Despite this limitation to very small domains, this limited verification can be useful for avoiding erroneous design, as errors tend to already show up at relatively small domains. It should be added that the logical methodology of the KB paradigm lends itself well to the usage of interactive theorem provers common in software verification in order to fully verify invariants over complex specifications. The integration of IDP and interactive theorem provers is, however, still future work.
Finally, let us turn to a task that supports a user of a system based on Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework: A principal i may want to reach a certain outcome, e.g. that a given principal j should no longer have a certain right while another principal k is unaffected. i may want to find out all revocation schemes that lead to the desired outcome. This can be achieved by computing Allmodels(T 2 ,S), where S is the structure that assigns the current authorization specification to pos_auth_start, and T 2 is the theory consisting of our specification of the delegation revocation framework together with the statement that the action at time point 0 is performed by i, and the statement that the desired outcome holds at time point 1. The values of the predicate action at time point 0 in the models returned by Allmodels(T 2 ,S) are the actions that i can perform in order to get the desired outcome.
Furthermore, i may want to reach a certain outcome for some given principals while minimally influencing the permissions of other principals. In that case, i can define a cost function, e.g. that every change in a permission of a principal has a cost of 1, and search the models returned by Allmodels(T 2 ,S) for the one with the minimal cost.
The IDP prototype that we have built can perform all the different tasks described in this subsection.
V. RELATED WORK
While the KB paradigm and its implementation IDP, are fairly young, its applicability has been investigated and illustrated in multiple domains. In [22] , the connection with Business Rules was investigated. Business Rules are wellrepresented in industry for knowledge-intensive applications and as such were used as a comparison to evaluate the KB paradigm. A typical Business Rules application, the EU-Rent Car-Rental company, was modelled in FO(·), and two use cases were investigated.
In [23] , the authors looked at applications of the IDP system, for interactive configuration systems, where the system is used to guide a user through a search space, looking for a valid configuration. The advantages of an explicit modeling of domain knowledge in configuration were large: the adaptability in case the domain knowledge changes and the fact that the same specification of knowledge could be reused in different tasks being the most important. This work was extended in [24] , where eight different reasoning tasks used in a configuration system were identified and implemented using logical inferences on 1 knowledge base, containing all domain knowledge.
While the KB paradigm has not been previously applied to the problem of delegation revocation, other logical methods have been applied to this access control problem: Aucher et al. [14] presented a formalization of Hagström et al.'s eight revocation schemes in a dynamic variant of propositional logic that resembles imperative programming languages. Furthermore, they extended their formalization with a notion of trust. Unlike our specification, which specifies the eight revocation schemes by specifying the formal properties of the three dimensions of the classification, their formalization defines each of the eight revocation schemes separately. Their formalization only supports the tasks of determining the state of the system after a certain action and of determining whether a user has a certain permission given a certain state of the system; the other tasks described in this paper are not supported by their formalization.
The main author of the current paper has defined a modified version of Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework [25] as well as Trust Delegation Logic, a logic of trust designed for studying the reasons for performing different revocation schemes defined [8] . This work was motivated by problems we encountered with Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework when we produced the first FO(·) specification of the framework; these problems are documented in [25] , [8] and [26] . In general, it should be noted that formally specifying something in FO(·) can help understanding it better and uncovering problematic features. As a further example of this, our work on FO(·) specifications of delegation revocation frameworks has also shown us that Aucher et al.'s [14] formalization actually deviates from Hagström et al.'s delegation revocation framework in multiple respects (see [26] for details).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explained the benefits of the knowledge base paradigm when applied to delegation revocation. The knowledge base paradigm proposes a strict separation between knowledge and problem solving. In our application, the knowledge is represented by an FO(·) specification of Hagström et al. [5] delegation revocation framework. By applying various logical inferences to this specification, multiple tasks that arise when implementing or using a delegation revocation system were solved. This way, the same information was reused for solving various problems.
Our work constitutes a proof of concept, and we hope that it will inspire other researchers in computer security to consider the possibility of applying the methodology of the knowledge base paradigm to their research.
